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RECENT CASES

of LaMoure,21 that North Dakota would follow the majority in construing a liquor license as a personal priviledge.
It is submitted that today, through legislative fiat, the tendency
is to involve the nature of the right in confusion by designating a
license a property right for one purpose and a priviledge for
another. As a result the courts are going to find that they will have
to go farther in solving the problem, and until they do, the apparent
inconsistencies and obvious confusion will continue to plague the
minds of intelligent men.
JAY MYSTER

JURY -

BIAS AND PREJUDICE -

AS PROPER SUBJECT OF INQUIRY IN

Voir Dire EXAMINATION - The defendant was convicted of dynamiting a public school building in the city of Little Rock. In the
course of the voir dire examination, the trial court refused to allow
the defense counsel to ask the veniremen, "Are you a segregationist
or an integrationist?" On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas
in affirming the conviction, held, two justices dissenting, that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in disallowing the question,
which had no bearing on the acceptability of a juror trying a man
for dynamiting a building, and which would be more confusing
than helpful in determining a juror's fitness. The dissent argued
that because of the common knowledge that the school was
dynamited to prevent integration, the question would be necessary
in order for the defense to ascertain possible bias and intelligently
exercise peremptory challenges. Lauderdale v. State, 343 S.W.2d
422 (Ark. 1961).
A form of voir dire examination to lay basis for challenge is
considered necessary to secure an impartial jury.1 Questions have
been considered acceptable even when they could not possibly
lead to grounds for challenge for cause, but were simply to enable
2
counsel to more intelligently utilize his peremptory challenges.
Bias is intimately related to the purpose of voir dire.' Potential
4
jurors may be examined as to their membership in political,
21.

77 N.D. 658, 44 N.W.2d 789 (1950).

1. Leach v. State, 31 Ala. App. 390, 18 So. 2d 285 (1944); Gurley v. State, 164
Ark. 397, 262 S.W. 636 (1924); People v. Lobb, 17 Il. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
2. Rose v. Magio, 220 Ala. 120, 124 So. 296 (1929); State v. Miller, 60 Idaho 79,
88 P.2d 526 (1939); People v. De Lordo, 350 Ill. 148, 182 N.E. 726 (1932); but see,
McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194 (1950).
3. "Durham .v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555 (1945); Murphy v. State, 72
Okla. Crim. 1, 112 P.2d 438 (1941) (dictum).
4.
United States v. Kertess, 139 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1944).
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religious,' industrial, fraternal 7 and other organizations whose
creeds and beliefs might cause the juror to be prejudiced in his
opinion of the case.' But it is necessary for counsel to indicate the
materiality of the interrogationY Proper questions to jurors concerning prejudice toward a race, such as the Negro, are permissable.10
In order to determine bias or prejudice a litigant is generally
allowed to ask specific questions rather than just general inquiries
concerning such prejudice or bias."' The question propounded must
be asked in good faith and with the purpose of ascertaining fact
rather than arousing passion or prejudice. 2 The remoteness of the
possibility of prejudice or bias in the particular jurisdiction should
not be controlling as to the acceptability of inquiry."
However, complete impartiality or lack of any belief or opinion
is not expected or necessary.' 4 The scope and extent of voir dire
examination rests within the reasonable discretion of the trial
court." The exercise of this descretion will not be disturbed on
appeal without a clear showing of abuse.16
Questions of a general, speculative, or "fishing" nature
asked in
deciding peremptory challenges may be refused by the court.' 7
Trial courts have been upheld in excluding questions dealing with
beliefs considered to have no bearing on the issue to be tried, or on
the fairness with which the juror could try the case. 8
North Dakota statute provides for voir dire examination to aid
in exercising peremptory challenges. 19 One North Dakota case 2
strongly hints that this state's courts will assume a broad view in
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Wasy v. State, 234 Ind. 52, 123 N.E.2d 462 (1955).

Commonwealth v. Figari, 166 Pa. Super. 169, 70 A.2d 666 (1950)
Bethel
People
People
Pinder

v.
v.
v.
v.

(dictum).

State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S.W. 740 (1924).
Buyle, 22 Cal. App. 2d 143, 70 P.2d 955 (1937).
Berman, 316 I11. 547, 147 N.E. 428 (1925).
State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (1891); Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575.

165 A.2d 889 (1960); State v. Pyle, 343 Mo. 876, 123 S.W.2d 166 (1938) (dictum).
11. Smith v. United States, 262 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1958).
12. Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 200 N.E. 762 (1936).
13. State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956).
14. Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 167 A.2d 96 (Md. 1961).
15. United States v. Barra, 149 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1945); Gurley v. State, 164 Ark.
397, 262 S.W. 636 (1924).
16. United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955); accord, United States v.
Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960).

17. McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194 (1950).
18. Commonwealth v. Figari, 166 Pa. Super. 169, 70 A.2d 666 (1950).
19. N.D. Cent. Code § 29-17-28 (1961) "Either party, prior to exercising either peremptory challenges or challenges for cause, may examine the jurors for the purpose of determining whether or not such party desires to exercise peremptory challenge or a challenge

for cause."
20. See Loveland v. Nieters, 79 N.D. 1, 54 N.W.2d 533 (1952).
(Although appealed
on somewhat different grounds, the court did not seem to feel that allowing the plaintiff
to question whether a prospective juror was a member of the Farmers Union was any abuse
of the court's discretion. It is virtually impossible to tell from' the reported case just what
relevancy this question had in light of the issues presented.)
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the exercise of their discretion in allowing specific questions on
voir dire examination.
It appears that the factual situation of each case would greatly
determine the extent to which North Dakota trial courts would
allow specific questioning regarding possible prejudice or bias. In
all probability the discretion of the trial court, if reasonably exercised, would be controlling.
WILLIAM 1H. BROWN
TRUSTS -

MANAGEMENT

INVESTMENTS -

MAY

A

AND

DISPOSAL OF TRUST PROPERTY -

COURT AUTHORIZE DEVIATION FROM EXPRESS

TERMS TO ACCOMPLISH THE DOMINANT INTENTION OF THE DONOR?

-Beneficiary
petitioned for orders authorizing trustees of two
separate trusts to deviate from restrictions on investments contained
in the instruments. The trusts were created in 1917 and 1919; the
settlor died in 1939. Investment provisions in both trusts provided,
generally, that the trustees should manage, care for and protect the
fund in accordance with their best judgment and discretion, and
invest in certain described property, "but not real estate nor corporate stock". The Supreme Court of Minnesota, held, that because
of changed conditions due to inflation since the trusts were created,, if deviation from authorized investments was not permitted,
accomplishment of the dominant intention of the donor to prevent
a loss of the principal of the trusts would be substantially impaired.
In re Trusteeship Under Agreement With Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900
(Minn.).
Courts have considered actual and clear necessity to be the test
for deviation from the express stipulations of the trust. 2 This becomes a question of fact which must be determined by the court in
view of the surrounding circumstances and the dominant intention
1. In the instant case the Court said: "In support of the petition, evidence was submitted that an inflationary period, which could not have been forseen, had commenced
shortly after the donor's death in 1939; that it had reduced the value of the trust assets
by more than 50 per cent; that a further inflationary period or a permanent "creeping inflation", which the donor could not have forseen, must be expected, . . .".
2. RESTATMENT (Second), TRUSTS § 167, comment c (1959) "Where by the terms
of the scope of investments which would otherwise be proper is restricted, the court will
permit the trustee to deviate from the restriction, if, but only if, the accomplishment of
the purposes of the trust would otherwise be defeated or substantially impaired. Thus the
court will permit the investment if owing to changes since the creation of the trust, such
as the fall in interest rates, the danger of inflation, and other circumstances, the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust would otherwise be defeated or substantially impaired.
Where by the terms of the trust the trustee is not permitted to invest in shares of stock,
the court will not permit such an investment merely because it would be advantageous to the
beneficiaries to make it."; see Scott, Deviation from the Terms of a Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1025 (1931).

